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ABSTRACT
 
     
  
본 논문은 이자율 준칙에 근거하여 한
국의 통화정책의 효율성을 인플레이션과 
산출갭의 상대적 안정성을 중심으로 경험
적으로 검증하는 데 목적이 있다. 이를 
위해 1991년 이후 한국의 주요 거시경제
변수를 설명할 수 있는 구조적 모형이 필
요한데, 본고에서는 Ball(1999)의 모형과 
유사한 소규모 개방경제모형을 도입한다. 
모형의 추정결과, 한국 거시경제 변수를 
비교적 잘 설명할 수 있음을 확인할 수 
있었고 추정된 모형을 바탕으로 이자율 
준칙의 범위 내에서 최적 통화정책을 도
출하였다. 따라서 최적 이자율 준칙하에
서의 인플레이션과 산출갭의 변동성을 실
제 데이터와 비교할 수 있다. 실증적 분
석의 결과, 중앙은행은 산출갭의 변동성 
보다 인플레이션의 변동성을 낮추는 데 
상대적으로 더 효율적이었음을 알 수 있
다. 이는 외환위기 이후 인플레이션이 실
제 중앙은행의 목표범위 내에서 하락 안
정세를 유지하였고 변동성도 상대적으로 
크지 않았음을 고려해 볼 때 타당한 결과
라고 해석할 수 있다. 그러나 최적 이자
율 준칙과 비교해 볼 때 실제 추정된 이
자율 준칙은 인플레이션에 대한 반응 정
도가 매우 낮아 인플레이션의 안정성이 
이자율 준칙이 효과적이었기 때문은 아닌 
것으로 나타났다. 또한 인플레이션을 유
발할 수 있는 실질환율 상승의 경우 이자
율을 오히려 하락시킨 것으로 나타났는
데, 이는 이론 및 최적 이자율 준칙과는 
배치되는 결과이다.
This paper evaluates the efficiency of monetary policy in Korea within the framework 
of interest rate feedback rules. For this, a small open macroeconomic model is 
constructed in a similar fashion to Ball (1999). The model is shown to capture key 
features of the Korean economy well. Using this estimated model, optimal instrument 
rules are derived for a set of different monetary policy objectives. Empirical results find 
that the actual monetary policy in the class of instrument rules was not very effective in 
stabilizing the output gap relative to inflation. However, seemingly successful inflation 
stabilization observed in the data are not consistent with the policy rules as the reaction 
of the interest rate to inflation is very low. It also appears that the central bank did not 
react right to movements in the real exchange rate. This paper offers some suggestions 
for the conduct of monetary policy in Korea.
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Ⅰ. Introduction
Since the beginning of the 1990s, an increasing number of central banks have 
adopted the inflation targeting system. Price stability becomes the primary goal of 
monetary policy. Mishkin and Posen (1997) find that inflation targeting in 
Germany, New Zealand, Canada, and the UK proved to be effective in lowering 
inflation without causing significant adverse consequences for output. In 1998, 
Korea also adopted inflation targeting under the provision of the revised Bank of 
Korea Act. The Bank of Korea (BOK) is no longer to pursue the dual objectives of 
maintaining the stability of the value of money and strengthening the soundness 
of the banking system, and is now entrusted with the primary goal of price 
stability. The revised Act shares elements reminiscent of those in earlier inflation 
targeting countries. Kim (1999), Kim and Kim (1999), and Hoffmaister (2001) offer 
a detailed discussion on the inflation targeting system of Korea.         
No doubt, the effectiveness of monetary policy becomes more important as a 
key requirement for pursuing inflation targets. There are several studies examining 
this issue for the case of Korea. However, most of them failed to take account of 
the fact that Korea is a small open economy. In some studies, the models were 
built under the assumption of closed economies, which should not be appealing 
(i.e. Oh, 1999; Lee, 2003; Nam, 2005). Others allowed for an openness of the 
Korean economy. Yet, they continued to assume a Taylor (1993) rule as the 
optimal monetary policy rule (i.e. Kim, 2002; Nam, 2002). The Taylor rule would 
be optimal only under certain conditions. In particular, Ball (1999) shows that for 
open economies, the Taylor rule is suboptimal unless it is modified in an 
important way. The main reason is that monetary policy affects the economy 
through exchange rate as well as interest rate channels.  
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the empirical efficiency of Korean 
monetary policy in an open-economy setting. Instead of employing full-fledged 
theoretical DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) models, we focus on 
the policy-oriented empirical models. The underlying model is similar to Ball 
(1999), which is an extension of Ball (1997) and Svensson (1997) to an open 
economy. It consists of an IS equation, a Phillips curve, a relation between 
exchange rates and interest rates, and a monetary policy rule. 
While the DSGE model approach has a clear advantage over the empirical 
counterpart as it is not subject to Lucas Critique, it also has disadvantages. First, 
there is no single right DSGE model to capture the salient empirical features, 
leading to model uncertainties. Second, as Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) forcibly 
argue, the practical macro models used by central banks in advanced countries 
such as the MPS model of the US Fed are the large-scale empirical models 
although forward looking expectations are imposed partially on several sectors. 
Third, the empirical fit of data of forward looking model such as New-Keynesian 
Phillips curve or intertemporal IS equation are typically worse than those of 
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empirical models. For example, Fuhrer (1997) examines empirical performance of 
two different Phillips curve and the backward looking autoregressive Phillips curve 
was not rejected against the forward looking counterpart. Finally, Taylor (1993) 
and Bomfim and Rudebusch (1997) argue that Rational Expectations may be 
unrealistic during the transition periods. This logic may apply to the Korean 
economy as it experienced a structural change after the financial crisis in late 
1990s. For these reasons, we believe that the disadvantage of using the empirical 
but structural model is outweighed by disadvantages of employing DSGE models.  
We also avoid using the completely atheoretical VAR approaches which are an 
another major strand in the literature analyzing monetary policy issues. This 
approach under the open economy models requires to estimate a larger number of 
parameters than that of the structural model. Given that the data is available only 
from 1991, the structural model is better fitted for our purpose and the VAR 
results will be used only to gauge the empirical fit of the structural model. 
Upon estimating this model, an optimal monetary policy rule is derived, and 
is used as a metric for evaluating the effectiveness of monetary policy in a similar 
fashion to Rudebusch and Svensson (2001). They evaluate the efficiency of several 
instrument rules over the historical performance in terms of variances of output 
gap and inflation. It is difficult to interpret the discrepancy of actual data from 
those implied my the optimal rule as an evidence of the policy inefficiency 
because the model is subject to the Lucas Critique and the optimality is valid 
only in the class of instrument rules. However, the relative efficiency can be 
judged across their model and the present model, apart from the fact that these 
models suffer from the same problems mentioned above. 
The implied optimal rule differs from the Taylor rule which many studies 
have assumed a priori. Notably, the exchange rate enters the right-hand side of 
the policy rule. This filters out temporary effects of the exchange rate on inflation, 
which may occur as the exchange rate returns to its long-run level. The idea is 
that such transitory fluctuations have no or little impact on medium- to long-term 
inflation prospects and should not affect policymakers' actions (see Bryan and 
Cecchetti, 1994; Ball, 1999).  
Empirical results find that the actual monetary policy in the class of 
instrument rules was not very effective in stabilizing the output gap relative to 
inflation. In particular, the discrepancy of variance of the output gap and that 
implied by the optimal rule is much larger than the discrepancy in the case of 
inflation. This may reflect the moderation in both the level and variances of 
inflation observed since the financial crisis. Therefore, one may conclude that the 
monetary policy rule has been relatively effective in control of inflation fluctuation. 
However, the reaction to inflation in the estimated interest rate rule is quite small, 
implying that the moderation in the variances of inflation is not supported by the 
instrument rule. Finally, it also appears that the central bank did not react right 
to movements in the real exchange rate, contrary to the theoretical prediction. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a 
model and its empirical adequacy is examined. Section 3 derives an optimal policy 
rule in the model. Section 4 considers different objective functions of monetary 
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policy. They are inflation targeting, equally weighted inflation and output gap 
targeting, and output gap targeting. The implied optimal rules are used to 
evaluate the efficiency of actual monetary policy. To the end, some policy 
implications are drawn for the conduct of monetary policy in Korea. Section 5 
concludes the paper.
Ⅱ. The model 
1. The model economy
The underlying model is due to Ball (1999) which studies monetary policy 
rules in an open economy. The evolution of the economy is represented by the 
following system. 
                                        (1)
                                              (2)
                                                            (3)
                                                                 (4)
where   is the inflation rate;   is the percentage gap between real output ( ) 
and potential output (), that is,     ;  is the log of the real
exchange rate (a higher e means depreciation);  is the Call rate; and    
and   are white noise disturbances. All parameters are positive, and all variables 
are measured as deviations from average levels.     
Equation (1) is an open economy Phillips curve. Inflation depends on its own 
lag, a lagged output gap, a lagged change in the real exchange rate, and an 
aggregate supply shock. Equation (2) is an open economy IS curve. The output 
gap depends on its own lags, a lagged real interest rate, a lagged real exchange 
rate, and a demand shock. Equation (3) posits a link between the real interest rate 
and the real exchange rate. It captures the mechanism that a rise in the interest 
makes domestic assets more attractive, leading to an appreciation. Equation (4) 
assumes that shocks to the real exchange rate follow an AR(1) process in order to 
capture the observed persistence in the real exchange rate. While exogenous, this 
specification can avoid additional endogenous variables such as the foreign short 
term interest rate and additional behavioral equations for the foreign countries.  
Although this model was originally designed for annual data, we apply to 
quarterly data with the following modifications. First,  is calculated as a simple 
moving average of the past four quarters. This construction controls seasonality 
which is extremely severe and irregular in the Korean data. In particular, even the 
de-seasonalized implicit GDP deflator and the implied inflation calculated by using 
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the official de-seasonalized real and nominal GDP, the seasonality does not 
disappear. We also compute the inflation rates of GDP deflator and consumer 
price index by applying the standard techniques such as X-11 or X-12 ARIMA, but 
they do not eliminate the seasonality. To this end, we may use   
         as an additional explanatory variables in the model. However,
a number of extra parameters must be added in this formulation. The moving 
average of inflation may be viewed as adding the lagged inflations with a 
restriction on the coefficients, in order to preserve the parsimony of parameters.  
Second,     is added in the IS equation to take account of short-run dynamics
better. Third,   is allowed to be serially correlated. However, its underlying 
shock,  , remains independent of the other two shocks. Finally, Ball (1999) 
calibrated the model using a set of base parameter values. Here, we estimate the 
model and analyze what the data speaks. 
To complete the model requires a monetary policy rule. We first use an 
interest rate feedback rule that explains the historical conduct of monetary policy 
in Korea. Later, this policy rule is canvassed for its effectiveness by comparison to 
the optimal rule implied by Equations (1) through (4) in the model. The following 
historical monetary policy feedback rule is considered. 
            (5)
 As will be proven below, the optimal instrument rule is a restricted version of 
Equation (5) that satisfies the prescribed monetary policy objective. As Ball(1999) 
showed, the optimal interest rate rule would be a linear function of the state 
variables in the model, which includes the real exchange rate. Therefore, one may 
interpret Equation (5) as determining a linear combination of the interest rate and 
the exchange rate, which is often called a monetary condition index.   
Since we focus on the dynamics of the model, we subtract constants in the 
model and estimate the model with demeaned data.
2. Estimation of the Model
The sample period runs from the first quarter of 1991 to the third quarter of 
2006.1 All data were obtained from the BOK website at http://www.bok.or.kr. As 
a proxy for the price level, we use the consumer price index and the rate of 
inflation is calculated using the CPI. The measure of real output is real GDP in 
2000 prices. The series on potential output is produced by filtering real GDP 
through the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The nominal interest rate is the uncollateralized 
overnight Call rate which is the monetary policy instrument of the BOK. The real 
exchange rate is constructed using the nominal exchange rate between Korea and 
the U.S. and their respective CPIs. 
The model is estimated using MLE equation by equation.2 3 The estimation 
1 Data on the official Call rate is available from the first quarter of 1991.
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results are given below.  
                  
   
                      (1)'
                      
    
            (2)'
      

                                                 (3)'
      
 
                                                      (4)'
                   
     
    
 
        (5)'
Figures in parentheses are the standard errors of parameter estimates and 
those in squared brackets are the standard deviations of the disturbances. 
  and   are the key parameters governing the monetary policy transmission 
channel to inflation and output gap. In Equations (1)' and (2)', they are estimated 
at 0.11 and 0.05 with expected signs. Their magnitudes are small, but this is 
common in the literature (see Cho and Moreno (2006) for example). The estimate 
of  at 0.07 is also sensible as a depreciation of the real exchange rate leads to a 
higher inflation. 
Meanwhile, Equation (3)' indicates that a rise in the real interest rate (   ) 
yields a real depreciation ( ). This prediction is in contrast to the 
standard economic theory. Nevertheless, the finding is consistent with the 
historical observation of 1990s, which exhibits a positive correlation between real 
exchange rates and real interest rates. This relationship is particularly strong since 
the financial crisis. The correlation for the period of 97:Q4 to 06:Q3 is 0.89.4 The 
positive relationship between the two variables also has a consequence on the IS 
curve. Contrary to the theory, the estimated equation (2)' implies that a real 
depreciation causes the output gap to fall ( ). While this finding is
puzzling, the negative coefficient,   may reflect the strong positive comovement 
between the real exchange rate and the real interest rate in equation (3)'.    
2 We did not estimate the model jointly because the parameters in Equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) 
may be affected and distorted by an arbitrary monetary policy feedback rule.
3 Equation (3) and (4) are jointly estimated by eliminating   in (3) using (4) such that
             . 
4 Two subsamples of 97:Q4 to 98:Q4 (financial crisis) and 99:Q1 to 06:Q3 (post-crisis) have their 
correlation coefficients at 0.95 and 0.20.
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3. Fit of the Model
The model's empirical adequacy is examined in two ways. First, we examine 
how well the model predicts the economy. Figure 1 depicts model predictions and 
actual data. The historical and predicted paths moves closely together. The model 
also captures the structural break during the financial crisis well. To shed more 
light, Table 1 reports the variances of the variables under consideration. There is 
no substantial difference between actual data and the model predictions. One 
exception is that the model overestimates the variance of real exchange rates. We 
also evaluate the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) of forecasts in our model 
relative to that of forecasts in the BOK04 model (a flagship model of the BOK) for 
the period of 2000:Q1 to 2003:Q4.5 Table 2 shows that the former is smaller than 
the latter, pointing out some forecasting gains in favor of our model.6 
[Figure 1] Model Prediction and Actual Data
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Note: This Figure shows the actual (solid lines) and predicted (dashed lines) values for inflation, 
the output gap, the real exchange rate and the interest rate associated with the estimated 
model (1') through (5').
5 The RMSE is calculated as    , where  and   are forecasted and
actual values, respectively. The BOK (Monthly Bulletin, 2005 May, p38) reports the RMSE of their 
forecasts only for the period of 2000:Q1 to 2003:Q4. 
6 Note that the measure of inflation in our model is the average value over the past four quarters. 
This may help to reduce the RMSE of inflation.  
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RMSE of  RMSE of 
BOK04(SA) 0.43 0.76
MODEL 0.293 0.733
 <Table 1> Actual and Projected Variances of the Variables
Var( ) Var( ) Var( ) Var( )
Data 4.27 7.04 66.53 27.41
Predicted 2.60 8.94 102.57 21.48
 Note: This Table show the actual variance and the predicted variances implied by the estimated model 
(1') through (5').
 <Table 2> RMSEs of the variables
 Note: The top row represents the figures of the root mean squared errors reported in Monthly 
Bulletin, p38, Bank of Korea, 2005. The bottom row show the RMSEs implied by the estimated 
model (1') through (5')
Second, we compare the impulse responses of our model to those obtained 
from a VAR. The VAR can summarize the general dynamics of the data and thus 
can provide a useful benchmark for the overall fit of a model. Our model can be 
viewed as a restricted specification from a four-variable VAR with two lags. 
Specifically, let        ′ . Then, Equations (1) through (5) can be 
expressed in a matrix form: 
          
This in turn produces the solution of the VAR(2) form as:
          , 
where    ,    , and     . Hence the model provides
 an identification restriction   on the coefficient matrix of the vector of the four 
structural shocks. The unrestricted VAR can be written as: 
         
In order to compare the impulse responses of the two models to the structural 
shocks of the same size, we rewrite the innovations of the unrestricted VAR such 
that  . We use this coefficient matrix   to compute the impulse 
responses of the four variables implied by the structural model and the 
unrestricted VAR to changes in one standard deviation of the four structural 
shocks. Figure 2 shows the results. The responses of the variables from our model 
are shown as thick lines. The corresponding figures from the VAR model are 
shown as dashed lines along with their 95% confidence intervals. All responses in 
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[Figure 2] Impulse Response
0 20 40
-1
0
1
In
fla
tio
n
AS
0 20 40
-2
0
2
IS
0 20 40
-10
0
10
EX
0 20 40
-5
0
5
MP
0 20 40
-1
0
1
O
ut
pu
t G
ap
0 20 40
-1
0
1
0 20 40
-5
0
5
0 20 40
-2
0
2
0 20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
E
xc
ha
ng
e 
R
at
e
0 20 40
-1
0
1
0 20 40
-5
0
5
0 20 40
-1
0
1
0 20 40
-1
0
1
In
te
re
st
 R
at
e
0 20 40
-1
0
1
0 20 40
-5
0
5
0 20 40
-2
0
2
%
Note: This Figure presents the impulse responses of inflation, the output gap. the real 
exchange rate and the interest rate to the AS shock, IS shock, real exchange rate shock 
and the monetary policy shock. Solid lines and dashed lines represent the impulse 
responses which arise under the structural model and the unrestricted VAR (2), 
respectively. Dotted lines are the 95 % confidence intervals implied by VAR (2).
our model reside inside the VAR' s confidence intervals. This suggests that the 
restrictions do not greatly alter the dynamics of the model relative to an 
unrestricted VAR.  
Ⅲ. The Optimal Monetary Policy Rule
 
This section derives an optimal monetary rule implied by Equations (1) to (4) 
in the model. Let                   ′  be the column vector
of the state variables. By substituting out the real exchange rate using Equation 
(3), the model can be written in terms of the state variables as: 
A Test on the Efficiency of Monetary Policy in Korea     127
                                   (6)
                                     (7)
                                                                (8)
In matrix form
                                                         
where  


 



, 


 

                                   
      
,  


 



 and  


 









(9)
It is assumed that the objective of monetary policy is to minimize the 
weighted average of the variances of inflation and output gap. Specifically, the 
loss function of the central bank is given by
                                              (10)
where  ≤  ≤   is the weight attached to the variance of  .
As Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) show, the optimal instrument rule will be 
of the form:
                                                                (11)
and  can be derived from solving the stochastic linear regulator problem 
(Sargent, 1987). One complication is that the interest rate implied by Equation (11) 
can be negative. To prevent this, we estimate  by minimizing the loss function 
subject to Equations (9) and (10), and a non-negativity condition for the nominal 
interest rate. Strictly speaking, the resulting feedback rule may not be optimal 
because an optimal function under the non-negativity condition is non-linear. 
However, it will be regarded as the optimal monetary policy rule,  since our 
focus is to evaluate the historical interest rate rule of Equation (5)' in the class of 
linear feedback rules. 
The optimal monetary policy rule can be more easily interpreted in the form 
of Taylor-type rules. To utilize this, recover the real exchange rate using Equation 
(3) as:
  
     
  
where           and            . Then replace   and 
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    with   and    , and let                   . This gives 
  
where   is an identity matrix with the last two rows being replaced with   
and   .
From     , the optimal policy rule can be cast as:
   
or equivalently, 
                         (12)
  
Note that Equation (12) is of the same form as the unconstrained policy rule 
in Equation (5).
Ⅳ. The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy
To evaluate the effectiveness of monetary policy, we estimate the model of 
Equations (1) to (4) under the optimal monetary policy rule in Equation (12). For 
a better understanding, a set of different objective functions are considered: 
namely, inflation targeting (IT), equally weighted inflation and output gap 
targeting (IYT), and  output gap targeting (YT). They correspond to the cases of 
   ,     and    , respectively, in Equation (10). Table 3 reports the 
variances of the variables calculated under the objective functions of IT, IYT, and 
YT. 
All the variances are much smaller than those observed in the actual data. Of 
particular interest are the variances of inflation and output gap, which constitute 
the objective functions of monetary policy. The results clearly show that there are 
gaps between the historical variances of inflation and the output gap, and those 
implied by the optimal instrument rule. This optimal policy is derived ex-post 
after observing all data and assuming the private agents do not take into account 
the optimal policy rule. Consequently, such an ex-post evaluation of the 
discrepancies between historical data and the one implied by the derived optimal 
rule may not be quantitatively interpreted as an evidence against the efficiency of 
the monetary policy rule. While Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) are subject to the 
same problem, they focus on measuring relative performances of the optimal 
policy rules under alternative specifications. In our case, we can use the 
discrepancies as relative metrics for evaluating the historical policy rules as 
follows. While the variance of output gap is over 7%, it is only 1.69% under the 
optimal monetary policy rules. For inflation, its variance reduces, but only by less 
than a half. An additional implication is, hence, that the actual monetary 
policytended to be relatively more successful in controlling the volatility of 
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 Var( ) Var( ) Var( ) Var( )
IT 2.78 1.69 6.28 9.99
IYT 2.81 1.61 10.08 13.75
YT 2.82 1.62 11.51 14.97
Data 4.27 7.04 66.53 27.41
 <Table 3> Variances of the Variables
 Note: The top three rows represent the variances implied by the structural model under the optimal 
monetary policy for inflation targeting (IT), the equally weighted inflation-output gap targeting 
(IYT) and the output gap targeting (YT). The last row reproduces the actual variances.
inflation than the volatility of output gap. 
Among the objective functions, IT records the smallest variance of inflation 
and the largest variance of the output gap. As   goes up, the variance of 
inflation gets larger, while that of the output gap gets smaller. This would be 
expected from the tradeoff between the variances of inflation and output. Figure 3 
shows, however, that the observed tradeoff is quite small. When there is a regime 
shift from IT to YT, the variance of inflation increases by 0.04%p and the variance 
of output gap falls by 0.07%p. The tradeoff between the two gets particularly 
weaker in the case that   is over 0.5. For example, IYT and YT produce the 
variances of inflation and output gap of the almost same magnitude.  
Table 4 reports the optimal policy rules in the form of Taylor-type rules. The 
coefficients on inflation and output gap are unanimously positive, consistent with 
economic theory. The optimal policy rule in IT calls for most strong reaction to 
inflation. IYT and YT also command that the interest rate rise more than one for 
one with inflation, as the coefficients are estimated at 2.75 and 2.42. In these 
cases, the weights attached to output gap are 2.67 and 2.58, respectively. For 
comparison, also reported in the table is the estimated Taylor rule by OLS. The 
coefficients on contemporaneous and lagged inflation are estimated at 0.16 and 
-0.19, The corresponding features for output gap are -0.01 and 0.22, respectively. 
All these estimates are quite smaller than those implied by the optimal policy 
rules. This suggests that the BOK did not actively stabilize inflation and the 
output gap. A consequence is that the actual variances of inflation and output gap 
are larger than the variances implied by the optimal monetary policy rules, as 
Table 3 already showed.  
Another important result is concerning the reaction of the BOK to movements 
in the real exchange rate. From Equations (2)' and (3)', a rise in the real interest 
rate yielded a real depreciation, which, in turn, caused the output gap to decline. 
In presence of a real depreciation, hence, the optimal monetary policy rule lowers 
the interest rate to stabilize inflation and the output gap. The estimation results in 
Table 4 confirm this, as the coefficients on the real exchange rate are all negative 
in the range of -0.91 to -2.85. However, the historical Taylor rule has an estimated 
coefficient of 0.19, indicating that the interest rate has actually risen in response to 
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       
IT 5.6590 -1.8874 3.3456 -1.2710 0.3612 -2.8497 0.3681
IYT 2.7510 -1.9029 2.6671 -0.8306 0.6146 -1.1117 0.0545
YT 2.4200 -1.8541 2.5783 -0.8105 0.6467 -0.9068 0.0087
Estimated   
Taylor Rule
0.1614 -0.1896 -0.0146 0.2182 0.9169 0.1867 -0.1905
 [Figure 3] Trade off between the Variance of Inflation and Output Gap
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Note: This Figure shows the inflation-output gap variance frontier implied by the 
structural model under the optimal monetary policy.
 <Table 4> Optimal Monetary Policy Rules
                       
 Note: The top three rows represent the coefficients in the optimal interest rate rule under inflation 
targeting (IT), the equally weighted inflation-output gap targeting (IYT) and the output gap 
targeting (YT). The last row show the coefficient obtained by the ordinary least squares 
estimation.  
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[Figure 4] Target versus Actual
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 Note: This Figure show the actual data (solid lines) with the values implied by the optimal 
monetary policy under inflation targeting (IT, dashed lines), equally weighted inflation and 
output targeting (IYT, dotted lines) and the output gap targeting (YT, dash-dotted lines).
the real depreciation. This may well amplify the volatilities of inflation and output 
gap as well as the volatility of real exchange rates itself. 
Figure 4 draws actual and optimal paths of inflation, the output gap, the real 
exchange rate, and the nominal interest rate. For a few years prior to the financial 
crisis, the output gap had been expanding, whereas inflation was moderate around 
4%. The interest rate, however, remained at lower levels, which would have 
added momentum to the economy. The real exchange rate was overvalued because 
the government tries to support a strong won. Large current account deficits were 
accumulated as a result. During that period, the optimal monetary policy rules 
continuously signaled that the interest rate must go higher. According to 
Equations (2)' and (3)', a rise in the interest rate yields a real depreciation which, 
in turn, causes the output gap to fall. This should act to stabilize the economy 
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with the variables returning to their optimal levels. As shown in the figure, the 
volatilities of inflation and output gap would have been reduced as well.
Ⅴ. Conclusion
This paper has set out to examine the efficiency of monetary policy in Korea. 
We construct a small open macroeconomic model that captures key features of the 
Korean economy. The optimal monetary policy rule is then derived from the 
model with zero lower bound constraint of the nominal interest rate. The paper 
considers three different objective functions of monetary policy: namely, inflation 
targeting, equally weighted inflation and output gap targeting, and output gap 
targeting. The implied optimal monetary rules are used as a gauge for evaluating 
the efficiency of the historical monetary policy rule. The main findings can be 
summarized as follows. 
First, the actual monetary policy rule was not very effective in stabilizing 
inflation and the output gap. The BOK could have achieved much lower variances 
of inflation and especially the output gap if it had responded strongly against 
upward pressures in inflation and output gap. Second, while the actual monetary 
policy was not effective, it was relatively more successful in containing the 
volatility of inflation than the volatility of output gap. This suggest that the BOK 
tends to focus more on the stability of inflation in accordance with the premise of 
inflation targeting. However, the seemingly relative success in stabilizing inflation 
variation is not supported by the monetary policy rules. Finally, the BOK did not 
react right to movements in the real exchange rate. This failure is likely to 
amplify the volatility of inflation and output gap as well as the volatility of real 
exchange rates itself. 
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